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Art Imitating Art
  Eric Brook 
Abstract
Using as a contextual reference my experience of seeing the original and copy
of Michelangelo's David in Florence, I briefly introduce how the Platonic legacy
has affected that discourse. The Western preference in art and aesthetics is
typically in favor of the original over the copy, despite whatever indiscernibility
may exist between them. Since Arthur Danto has treated this phenomenon in
his text The Transfiguration of the Commonplace, his relevant comments are
considered and adapted for the purpose of working through how one
understands the relationship between the original and copy in terms of a
criterion for defining art.
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In the center of Florence, the Piazza della Signoria stands as an august
remnant of the city's Renaissance past. Just before the entry to the Palazzo
Vecchio that overlooks the city plaza, a copy of Michelangelo's David occupies
the space formerly held by its original counterpart, which now resides in the
gallery of the Accademica in Florence. The sheer throng of people that I first
witnessed around the statue in the plaza would make one speculate about
whether or not this David was the original. However, judging by the extensive
line outside the Accademica, it was obvious that enough people knew where
to find the original David.
I endured that line with one of my students in the blistering heat of summer.
Once inside, we walked through the halls of the Accademica, past the
"unfinished" sculptures of Michelangelo, to stand beneath the power of his
masterpiece. I spent roughly 45 minutes walking around David and then
made my way back with the student to meet the others from our university.
Upon returning, a colleague of mine asked the student whether or not he had
seen the original David and whether or not he had seen the copy. When the
student affirmed that he saw both, my colleague asked him if he could tell the
difference between the original and the copy. Immediately, the student
exclaimed: "Of course, the original glows!" My thoughts were actually
preoccupied with the idea that a good copy is typically one that cannot be
easily distinguished from the original; but after hearing my student's
response, I began to ponder what he said. Was I not chosen? Why did I not
see the glow?
Michelangelo’s David.[1] David, Piazza della Signoria (Photo:Markus Bernet).[2]
Upon reflection, I do not think that the student was simply describing the
clean surface of the marble or the lighting of the Accademica. Rather, I think
it was closer to what Arthur Danto describes in his book The Transfiguration
of the Commonplace. Much of what Danto says there applies directly to this
experience of the original and copy of Michelangelo's David, since he remarks
that he is "obsessed with paired cases where only one member of the couple
is an artwork."[3] More explanatively: "We are bound to find two (at least)
representations, indiscernible in any merely visual sense, only one of which
will be an artwork" (139). My focus on Danto's discussion of indiscernibles will
not concentrate on his desire to define the nature of art but will consider how
to extend Danto's criteria for art in comparison to this experience of seeing
the copy and the original of Michelangelo's David in Florence.
The response of the student in describing the original David would appear to
betray a Platonic default in Western aesthetics. Anyone familiar with Plato's
philosophy knows that he places the original forms in the timeless brightness
above the heavens while understanding everything in the shifting shadows of
this world as copies of these original forms. The Allegory of the Cave and the
Divided Line in Plato's Republic both signify as much. Plato offers an
epistemology and ontology of the original and copy where reality itself is best
understood in terms of the original. This original is what can be truly known
and seen as the original, the eidos or Form in itself. That which one sees in
the Form is the light of knowledge and truth. To know the Form is to have
true illumination. Any formal resemblance between all other things and this
original is something of a deception, or eikos, as it may simply appear to be
like the original. The copy can never be less than an imitation of the original.
Plato's value theory follows from this preference for the original such that a
copy always has less value than the original. Thus in our language today the
word "imitation" carries the intension of diminished value and can be used
synonymously with what is fraudulent. To take the copy for an original is to
be deceived and defrauded.
It is not Plato's theory of art per se that has impacted the West but the
application of his philosophy of the original and copy to aesthetic judgments.
We are all not ravenous iconoclasts, and art, including discourse about art, to
some extent still retains value in our society. But instead of seeking for the
"real" in the heavens, we simply prefer the original as "real" while the copy
cannot be designated by this category. In this regard, a copy of an art piece
can never be art in the true sense of the word. Hence, in the Platonic view of
things, the copy of Michelangelo's David is not art, but stands in place of the
absent art. Here we may have the beginning of an explanation for my
student's epiphany. Using the idea of transfiguration, Danto comments: "It is
possible that the work of art was the one that glowed, but incandescence
could not be the sort of differentia a definition of art would look for" (vii). It is
precisely this illuminationist approach that has defined the preference for the
original ever since Plato, and Danto has been intent on challenging it. In
Platonic terms, the original must glow, but according to Danto this is not a
sufficient basis for distinguishing indiscernibles.[4]
It could be argued that a Platonic ontology is not the only basis for
distinguishing the original from the copy or even for preferring the original to
the copy. We can take one step forward in the history of philosophy and
consider how someone like Aristotle could account for the reality of
Michelangelo's David in terms of its copy. For example, if we use Aristotle's
four causes, we can see where a clarification can be made between the
original and copy. When comparing the four causes of the original and copy,
the material and formal causes correlate: both being marble; both being the
form of David. However, in the third cause, the efficient cause, there is a
difference. In the original, Michelangelo worked on the marble to bring into
actuality his idea of David. Thus, the idea could be said to have originated
with Michelangelo, and he was the one who originally executed its form in the
marble. There would, of course, be an extended consideration of the final
cause, or purpose, for the statue, but it would probably be safe to say that
Michelangelo had some kind of artistic purpose in mind when creating it.
This being said, any number of philosophies pertaining to the original/copy
dichotomy could be advanced beyond what is offered in Plato, but my
suspicion is that these other notions are not what typically come to mind
when people in Western culture evaluate art. Furthermore, using an
Aristotlean perspective, as Danto himself does to some extent, we could
distinguish between the original and copy in its formal and efficient causation
(and possibly in the historical accidents related to the material of quarried
marble and Michelangelo's Renaissance purpose), but could we also explain
why a preference would be made for the original over the copy? Possibly, but
our explanation would probably hover around the historical value placed upon
Michelangelo in his Florentine context.[5] At this juncture, we can return to
Danto's treatment of indiscernibles.
In Danto's treatment of mimesis, he speaks of "bracketing" as the context
indicating how one is to understand the relationship of the copy to the
original. His main concern in this discussion is in the way art imitates life
("real things," as he puts it), specifically with an example taken from theater.
Seeing the play within the theater cues the audience to interpret it as
mimesis through "conventions of dislocation" that make the aesthetic
experience of the theater possible. Thus, "it is precisely the confidence that
the conventions are understood which enables the mimetic artist to carry
mimesis to its extreme point, to make whatever is to appear within the
relevant brackets as much like what would be encountered in reality as he can
manage" (23). Following Aristotlean concepts of mimesis, Danto argues that
these brackets allow for the experience of pleasure since through them we are
aware that the experience is mimesis. In any other context, we would be
puzzled or unsure as to how to interpret the experience.
Danto is not content to leave the aesthetic experience, or more directly the
definition of art, at the mercy of these conventional brackets; but he does
appreciate that the brackets provide a meaningful way for talking about art
more generally. It seems that his concern with bracketing is found in how it
functionally resembles quotation marks to indicate a quote. Once quotation
marks are added, one now has a different interpretive stance toward the
words. These words are not original for the one quoting them. Danto's fuller
reflection upon indiscernibility goes beyond the mimesis of one work placed
within the conventional brackets of another context. His example is from
Borges's text Pierre Menard, Symbolist Poet, where "he describes two
fragments of works, one of which is part of Don Quixote by Cervantes, and
the other, like it in every graphic respect – like it, indeed, as much as two
copies of the fragment by Cervantes could be – which happens to be by Pierre
Menard and not by Cervantes" (33). He argues that the one is not a copy or
quotation of the other because they derive their aesthetic appeal from two
different historical contexts. And this is part of the overall thrust of Danto's
philosophy of art: "To see something as art at all demands nothing less than
this, an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art"
(135).
At this point, Danto's comments may apply and not apply in two different
ways to the copy and original of Michelangelo's David. With the case of Pierre
Menard's work, the historical context of the actual words was different from
the original. Thus there was no bracketing, no quoting of the text. Yet with
the copy of Michelangelo's David in the Piazza della Signoria, we do have an
actual copy set forth as a copy. It is not to be interpreted as the original in
the Accademica. But where is the bracketing that will conventionally indicate
to me that this is a copy? Had I not been told that this was a copy, I may
have easily taken it to be the original, because the copy is bracketed within
its original Florentine context. It stands precisely where the original David
stood for a few hundred years. By looking at the copy I can get a sense of
what it meant for Michelangelo's David to stand as a symbol of Florentine
civic pride before the city hall.
In contrast, the original David is now confined within the conventions of
dislocation. There is nothing about the Accademica that would indicate to me
the kind of historical significance that Michelangelo's David had when standing
in the central square of the city. The form that the original has now, with the
arm broken in city riots restored, carries within it the marks of Florentine civic
struggle. In the Accademica Michelangelo's David is bracketed out of context,
within the pristine glow of a modern museum.
If we are to apply and extend Danto's criteria for the definition of art, the
indiscernibility of the original and copy cannot be resolved with immediate
reference to the history of art. I can say that the original David once stood in
the Piazza della Signoria as a symbol of Florentine civic humanism and
embodied the defiance of the city against foreign aggression; but it does not
stand there now. As with so many pieces of art that now stand in places like
the Louvre or the British Museum, the original David is not in its original
historical context. Of course, considerations of artistic conservation and
accessibility may come into play with our current context, but here I am
looking at the discussion from the standpoint of indiscernibility of the original
and copy. Given the dislocation of the original and the contextualization of the
copy, would it still be appropriate to favor the original over the copy? Maybe
in the grander scheme of things we would. I do not think that anyone would
be satisfied with the neglect of the original for the copy. But it does seem that
having the copy, as a copy, standing in the original place of the original
serves a significant function for how art is interpreted, which is a key factor in
Danto's assessment of what makes art what it is. Danto is correct in
maintaining that a piece of art is not ascertained as such merely on formal
grounds. This is probably the one area where Danto's discussion of
indiscernibility is most relevant, since it provides the terms upon which the
discourse about indiscernibles can move forward. Thus, what I am advocating
here is not so much a thorough critique of Danto's approach but rather an
application and exploration of it based upon a particular historical example.
To increase our perspective it may also be of use to consider the third copy of
Michelangelo's David, in the Piazza Michelangelo atop the adjacent hill
overlooking the city of Florence. Again, we have here an obvious copy, but
none of the ambiguity associated with bracketing. The original statue never
stood on this hill, nor is my historical appreciation for the original enhanced in
any significant way by seeing it looking over the city. This copy would be a
good example of the art work in quotation. As one views the cityscape of
Florence, it could be suitable to associate what one sees with a symbol of the
city's historic identity, much as a mayor in the United States might quote the
Declaration of Independence in a speech before the city on the 4th of July. I
know how to interpret the copy on the hill since the conventions of
dislocation, and the copy as well, serve to give me some context.
Given the historical context of the copy standing in the Piazza della Signoria,
am I not justified using Danto's criteria in asserting that this copy is in fact
art? It may not be the original art of Michelangelo's David, but its substitution
for it in the plaza does serve an important artistic function, which according to
Danto is a key aspect to defining art. Any consideration given to mimesis
would not necessarily involve a simple rejection of the copy in the city square.
It has an artistic presence there, with all the other "original" sculptures
around it. If this copy is to be understood in terms of imitation, it would not
be a mere object imitating art. It would probably be better to speak of the
copy as art imitating art, carrying the connotations appropriate for something
deemed to be art. Granted, with Michelangelo's David we have a unique
history involved with the location of the original work of art that may not
apply to the same extent to other works, even if this involved another case of
indiscernibles. Danto himself has used various examples to illustrate his
philosophy of art in The Transfiguration of the Commonplace. Michelangelo's
David is a vivid, notable, and possibly unmatched example of how Danto's
views can be applied to what would appear as an obvious work of art for
which there would be no controversy concerning its status as art.
My colleague who asked my student the question related to the original and
copy was content enough to leave Florence without viewing the original
because he saw the copy. And he felt justified in doing so because anyone
who went to see the original could not tell the difference. I am definitely not
willing to go that far with how I will evaluate the original and copy, but
whenever I think back to my experience of Michelangelo's David, the one in
the Piazza della Signoria first comes to mind – for obvious historical reasons.
Endnotes
[1] Photograph published GNU Free Documentation License.
[2] Photograph published under Creative Commons.
[3] Arthur C. Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of
Art (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981) p. 90. References to this
text will be made parenthetically in the body throughout.
[4] No direct association is being made between this discussion of glowing
and any other illuminationist approach to art (such as Benjamin's "aura"
concept). My concern is only with an analysis of Danto's explanation of the
phenomenon of glowing related to Plato and the application of Platonic
metaphysics in the history of Western aesthetics. The phenomenon is only
under discussion here inasmuch as it reflects the actual description of the
experience of the work of art in terms of the language of original and copy
and the aesthetic criterion used to distinguish original and copy when defining
art.
[5] The basis for couching an aesthetic discussion with reference to Plato and
Aristotle, besides the use that Danto makes of them, has been argued well by
Stephen Halliwell in "The Importance of Plato and Aristotle for Aesthetics,"
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, 5 (1991),
321-348.
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